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“It is said that no one truly knows a nation until one has been inside 
its jails. A nation should not be judged by how it treats its highest 
citizens, but its lowest ones.” 
              Nelson Mandela 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of recent mass shootings, journalists, social 
advocates, politicians, physicians and average American citizens broadly 
discussed the state of mental health care in this country.1  When Ariel 
Castro, the man who kept three women imprisoned in his home for 
nearly a decade, committed suicide in his jail cell, people once again 
discussed mental health care, though more specifically, in the prison 
system.2  Lindsay Hayes, of the National Center on Institutions and 
Alternatives, stated, “it was the responsibility of the mental health staff at 
the prison to send him (Castro) through a battery of tests and assessments 
to determine whether he was currently displaying any suicidal ideation or 
behavior” and suggested that Mr. Castro had not received such 
treatment.3  Mr. Castro’s situation, including his death within the 
confines of his own prison cell, was not unique. 
                                                                                                             
 NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM: AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF NELSON MANDELA 
187 (1994). 
 1 See, e.g., Phil Tenser, 128-Page Mental Health Report About Aurora Movie 
Theater Shooting Defendant James Holmes Finished, ABC NEWS (Denver) (Sept. 9, 
2013), http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/movie-theater-shooting/128-page-mental-
health-report-about-theater-shooting-defendant-james-holmes-finished; Stephanie 
O’Neill, Can Better Mental Health Care Prevent Mass Killings Like The Sandy Hook 
School Shootings?, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC RADIO (Dec. 19, 2012), 
http://www.scpr.org/news/2012/12/19/35296/can-better-care-severely-mentally-ill-
prevent-mass/; Jason Cherkis, Sandy Hook Mental Health: Program Gaps May Be Easier 
To Fix Than Gun Laws, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.huffington
post.com/2012/12/19/sandy-hook-mental-health-program_n_2334017.html; Sydney 
Lupkin, Newtown Shooting Put Spotlight on U.S. Mental Health Care – Again, ABC 
NEWS (Dec. 19, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/newtown-shootings-put-spotlight-
mental-health-care/story?id=18001556 (noting that today, the largest mental health 
facilities are for inmates: Los Angeles County Jail in California, Cook County Jail in 
Illinois and Rikers Island off New York City); see also Paige St. John, California Prisons 
Haven’t Improved Mental Healthcare Enough, Court Says, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/05/local/la-me-ff-prisons-20130406. 
 2 Yamiche Alcindor and Donna Leinwand Leger, Disdain, Questions Surround 
Suicide Of Ariel Castro, USA TODAY (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2013/09/04/castro-kidnapper-suicide-jail/2768207/. 
 3 Id. 
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Today, mental illness is endemic in prisons across this country.4  A 
recent study published by Psychiatric Services, a journal of the American 
Psychiatric Association, reported that prisoners are two to four times 
more likely than members of the general population to develop serious 
forms of mental illness.5  Additionally, the study reported that of the 
20,000 inmates surveyed, 16.9 percent had a severe mental illness at the 
time of data collection.6  The Bureau of Justice Statistics has estimated 
that the majority of state and federal prisoners suffer from the most 
serious forms of mental illness,7 including schizophrenia, bipolar 
disorder and severe depression.8  Additionally, Human Rights Watch has 
reported that approximately fifteen to twenty percent of inmates require 
psychiatric intervention during incarceration.9  Instead of providing such 
treatment, however, some prisons officials move individuals with mental 
illness into solitary confinement.10  Moreover, some officials ignore 
inmates, allowing them to sit in their own feces, become destructive or 
engage in self-mutilation.11 
                                                                                                             
 4 See Jacques Baillargeon et al., Psychiatric Disorders and Repeated Incarcerations: 
The Revolving Prison Door, 166 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 103 (2009); Antonia Moras, 
Human Rights Watch: The Mentally Ill in U.S. Prisons—A Review, 21 ALASKA JUSTICE F. 
1, 2–4 (2004); see also Mental Illness, Human Rights, and U.S. Prisons, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/09/22/mental-illness-human-
rights-and-us-prisons. “Mental illness” is described as “anxiety, depression, anger, 
cognitive disturbances, perceptual distortions, obsessive thoughts, paranoia, and 
psychosis.”  Id.  The lack of social interaction as well as structure within the prison 
system can create mental illness or prompt a reoccurrence.  Id. 
 5 Henry J. Steadman and Fred C. Osher, Prevalence of Serious Mental Illness 
Among Jail Inmates, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 6 (2009), available at http://ps.psychiatry
online.org/article.aspx?articleID=100482. 
 6 Id. 
 7 James R. P. Ogloff and Ronald Roesch, Mental Health Research in the Criminal 
Justice System: the Need for Common Approaches and International Perspectives, 18 
INT. J. LAW PSYCHIATRY. 1, 1–14 (1995).  The term “severe mental illness” is often linked 
to the acute psychopathology that some patients experience in state mental health 
facilities.  Id. 
 8 See Mental Illness, Human Rights, and U.S. Prisons, supra note 4. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Jeffrey L. Metzner and Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in 
U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 22, 2010), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/03/22/solitary-confinement-and-mental-illness-us-prisons. 
 11 See, e.g., Young v. City of Augusta, 59 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 1995).  Young was 
arrested for stealing cigarettes and sentenced to serve a ninety-day sentence.  Id. at 1163.  
Before being transported to the jail, Young was placed in a holding cell where she lit her 
shoes and underwear on fire.  Id.  As a result, she damaged the holding cell and was 
charged with damaging city property.  Id.  After serving her sentence, Young brought a 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 action against jail officials, claiming that they showed deliberate 
indifference towards her serious medical needs.  Id. 
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Consider the following case from Newark, New Jersey, where a 
woman was incarcerated for setting a fatal fire.12  While in jail, prison 
psychiatrists diagnosed her as suffering from schizophrenia and multiple 
personality disorder.13  According to her lawyers, “she deliberately cut 
her right arm and leg badly enough to require 28 stitches.  Because self-
mutilation violates prison rules, she was sentenced to 90 days in what is 
called administrative segregation, the solitary confinement unit at 
Northern State.”14  “The mere process of putting someone who’s 
mentally ill in isolation for a long time will in itself cause most mentally 
ill prisoners to become even sicker,” said Patricia Perlmutter, former 
head of the Inmate Advocacy Law Clinic at the Seton Hall University 
School of Law’s Center for Social Justice.15  “It’s like beating a dog and 
leaving it in a cage and making it as violent as you can . . . ” said Dr. 
Grassian, a clinical psychiatrist from Harvard University.16  “What do 
you think is going to happen when you open the cage?”17 
Upon opening “the cage,” one may find that the prisoner has 
committed suicide.  Prison officials often place the mentally ill in 
compromising situations that worsen psychiatric disorders, including 
one’s propensity to commit suicide.18  Consider other recent examples 
from Arizona, where almost every day, one inmate attempts suicide.19  
Among those who died: 
                                                                                                             
 12 Andy Newman, N.J. LAW; Filing Suit to Protect the Mentally Ill Who Are Behind 
Bars, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/21/nyregion/nj-law-
filing-suit-to-protect-the-mentally-ill-who-are-behind-bars.html. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id.; see also STATE OF N.J. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS (2013), http://www.state.nj.us/
corrections/.  Northern State is a correctional facility for male offenders located in 
Newark, New Jersey.  Id. 
 15 See Newman, supra note 12. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id.; see also Jean Casella & James Ridgeway, Louisiana Jail Locks Up Suicidal 
Prisoners in 3’x3’ Cages, SOLITARY WATCH: NEWS FROM A NATION IN LOCKDOWN (Jul. 9, 
2010), http://solitarywatch.com/2010/07/09/louisiana-jail-locks-suicidal-prisoners-in-3-x-
3-cages/.  The authors describe mentally ill prisoners placed in worse conditions than the 
minimum standard allowable for dogs.  Id. 
 18 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS: NAT’L STUDY OF JAIL 
SUICIDE: 20 YEARS LATER 1, 11 (2010), available at http://static.nicic.gov/Library/
024308.pdf.  Upon incarceration, the prisoner may experience the loss of outside relation-
ships, victimization, further legal frustration and physical and emotional breakdowns, 
among other emotions, that may cause suicide.  Id. at 1. 
 19 Bob Ortega, Critics: ‘Maximum Security’ a Factor in Prison Suicide Rate, THE 
REPUBLIC (Ariz.) (Jun. 2, 2012), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2012/06/02/
20120602arizona-prison-suicide-rate.html. 
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Tony Lester was diagnosed as mentally ill.20  He bled to death 
after using a razor to slash his throat, arms and groin;21 
Rosario Rodriguez-Bojorquez killed himself while alone in his 
cell after he was denied requests to move into another cell 
because he was paranoid of other inmates;22 
Karot Phothong used a bed sheet to hang himself while in 
solitary confinement after he was denied the opportunity to visit 
with mental health professionals.23 
Today, there is robust debate regarding how to treat the mentally ill 
in prison.  Nation-wide, human rights advocates believe that a strong 
correlation exists between mental health care in prisons and the rate of 
suicide amongst inmates; as a result, they believe that prisons must adopt 
medically-supported practices for dealing with the mentally ill.24  
Corrections officials have generally defended their current practices, 
however, explaining that the use of certain measures, like solitary 
confinement, is necessary to protect the inmate and ensure prison 
safety.25  The government has stated that these measures may be used as 
safeguards to ensure inmate safety.26 
This debate, regarding how to treat the mentally ill in prison, has 
spilled over into the courts.27  Today, when a family-member or loved 
one brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against a correctional facility after 
an inmate has committed suicide, every circuit applies the deliberate 
indifference standard to adjudicate the dispute.28  Yet, each circuit has 
interpreted the deliberate indifference standard differently, thus leaving 
room for different levels of mental health care in prisons.29  This 
                                                                                                             
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Jean Casella & James Ridgeway, Prisoners With Mental Illness Suffer-and Die-in 
Arizona’s Solitary Confinement Cells, SOLITARY WATCH: NEWS FROM A NATION IN 
LOCKDOWN (May 7, 2012), http://solitarywatch.com/2012/03/07/prisoners-with-mental-
illness-suffer-and-die-in-arizonas-solitary-confinement-cells/.  The authors describe the 
conditions that some mentally ill prisoners face in Arizona prisons.  Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See, e.g., Scott Shane, Obama Defends Conditions for Soldier Accused in 
WikiLeaks Case, N.Y.  TIMES (Mar. 1, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
03/12/us/12manning.html. 
 27 See infra Part III and accompanying discussion. 
 28 See infra Part III and accompanying discussion. 
 29 See infra Part III and accompanying discussion. 
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Comment argues that the judiciary should adopt a new and more precise 
legal standard to remedy the current circuit split regarding 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 jail-suicide claims; doing so will affect the type of mental health 
care that prisons provide to inmates.30  Creating clear guidelines to 
protect the mentally ill in the courts is a legal imperative that will yield 
positive human rights reform. 
First, this Comment briefly explores the historical and theoretical 
antecedents to current mental health care in the prison system.  Second, it 
analyzes the multi-dimensional, multi-layered circuit split that exists 
with respect to the interpretation and application of the deliberate 
indifference in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 jail-suicide claims.  This section then 
highlights two recent circuit court cases from the Eleventh and Third 
Circuits.  Third, this Comment proposes that the deliberate indifference 
standard be eliminated in light of its vague meaning and unpredictable 
application and that a new, more precise legal standard rooted in 
international law be adopted.  Finally, this Comment addresses important 
countervailing considerations in resolving the circuit split and closes by 
reaffirming that the United States should protect all of its citizens, 
including those deemed to be its “lowest.” 
II.  HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL ANTECEDENTS: THE ROAD TO 
CURRENT MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS 
During much of the twentieth century, the United States medical 
community had a limited understanding of mental illness and suicide.31  
Both issues seemed to play a taboo role in public discourse,32 while the 
medical community was generally more focused on AIDs and cancer 
research.33  Until the latter end of the century, medical experts postured 
that anyone who committed suicide necessarily had some long, pre-
                                                                                                             
 30 See Eric Rosenthal and Clarence J. Sundram, The Role of Int’l Human Rights in 
Nat’l Mental Health Legis., DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCE, 1 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 18 (2005), available at http://www.who.int/mental_health/policy
/international_hr_in_national_mhlegislation.pdf. 
 31 Ellen Holtzman, A Home Away from Home, 43 MONITOR ON PSYCHOLOGY 3 
(2012). 
 32 Mark Rice-Oxley, Critics: We Need to Keep Talking About Depression, THE 
GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/08/
keep-talking-about-depression. 
 33 See generally Pol’y Topics, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS (2012), 
http://www.nami.org. 
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existing mental illness.34  Today, it is understood that a multitude of 
factors, including an extreme, sudden change in one’s life, extreme 
psychological and sexual neglect and the removal or seclusion of oneself 
from society, either by personal choice or by force,35 can give rise to 
suicide.36  Significantly, these are all factors that an inmate may 
experience.  Thus, in the context of the prison system, a prisoner who 
commits suicide may have done so on account of a pre-existing 
condition, the sudden changes that he experienced as a result of being in 
custody, or a combination of the two. 
As the medical community published new studies on mental health 
and suicide, the human rights community moved for social and legal 
reform in these areas.37  For example, in 1991, the United Nations 
General Assembly adopted the “Principles for the Protection of Persons 
with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care” (the 
“MI Principles”).38  While the MI Principles are non-binding in the 
United States, they set a standard for dealing with the mentally ill.39  The 
MI Principles protect a wide range of duties owed to the mentally ill, 
such as protections against “harm, including unjustified medication, 
abuse by other patients, staff or others.”40  Moreover, the MI Principles 
require that medical facilities and correctional facilities monitor the 
mentally ill to ensure that their human rights are being protected and that 
their treatment is “based on an individually prescribed plan.”41 
                                                                                                             
 34 Jose Manoel Bertolote, Alexandra Fleischmann, Diego De Leo & Danuta 
Wasserman, Suicide And Mental Disorders: Do We Know Enough?, BRITISH J. OF PSYCH. 
(2003), http://bjp.rcpsych.org/content/183/5/382.full. 
 35 Suicide and Suicidal Behavior, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED. (2012), http://www.nlm.
nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001554.htm; see also Natalie Staats Reiss & Mark 
Dombeck, Suicide: Other Factors Contributing to Suicide Risk, MENTALHELP.NET, 
http://www.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=doc&id=13738 (last updated Oct. 24, 
2007). 
 36 See generally Idiko Suto, Dissertation, Inmates Who Attempted Suicide in Prison: 
A Qualitative Study, PAC. U. COMMON KNOWLEDGE PROJECT (2007), http://commons.
pacificu.edu/spp/46. 
 37 See PAHO/WHO Collaborating Center On Public Health Law and Human Rights, 
PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION (2012), http://www1.paho.org/English/D/
Georgetown_CCenter_MRoses.htm.  See generally MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: VISION, PRAXIS, AND COURAGE (Michael Dudley et al. eds., 2012). 
 38 See The Role of Int’l Human Rights in Nat’l Mental Health Legis., supra note 30, 
at 12. 
 39 Id. at 15, 21 (noting that the standards described here can apply to psychiatric 
facilities as well as non-psychiatric facilities for both mentally-ill and mentally-stable 
persons). 
 40 Id. at 21. 
 41 Id. 
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In 1993, members of the World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna reaffirmed the belief that human rights law must protect people 
with mental disabilities and that governments must establish legislation 
to ensure protection of these rights.42  Participants of the Vienna 
Convention affirmed in writing that “people with mental disabilities are 
protected by the same human rights law that protects all other 
individuals.”43  Human rights advocates recognized that the mentally ill 
must have the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health, that they must be protected against discrimination, that 
they must be protected against torture, inhuman or degrading treatment 
and must be treated like the rest of society.44 
Against this backdrop, and with the advent of more scientific 
knowledge, the United States government promoted a policy shift in the 
1990s to “deinstitutionalize” the mentally ill and have courts place these 
individuals amongst the mainstream prison population.45  Yet, while the 
medical and human rights communities have taken significant steps to 
understand and protect the mentally ill over the last thirty years,46 the 
United States prison47 and justice48 systems have both lagged far behind.  
Placing the mentally ill in the prison system may have actually frustrated 
mental health care reform. 
Today, in correctional facilities across the country, the suicide rate 
is approximately two and a half times higher than the national average.49  
For an inmate with a serious mental illness, such as manic depression, 
                                                                                                             
 42 Id. at 18. 
 43 Id. at 12. 
 44 See supra note 30. 
 45 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, MENTALLY ILL PERSONS IN 
CORRECTIONS (Dec. 11, 2012), http://nicic.gov/MentalIllness. 
 46 See, e.g., Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977) (noting that “modern 
science has rejected the notion that mental or emotional disturbances are the products of 
afflicted souls, hence beyond the purview of counseling, medication and therapy”). 
 47 From Prisons to Hospitals and Back: The Criminalization of Mental Illness, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (2012), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/menbrief.html. 
 48 James R. P. Ogloff, Ronald Roesch & Stephen D. Hart, Mental Health Services in 
Jails and Prisons: Legal, Clinical, and Policy Issues, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 109, 119 
(1994) (“Unfortunately, the Court has yet to decide a case that directly addresses the 
extent to which prison and jail inmates have the right to psychological or psychiatric 
assessment and treatment.”). 
 49 Ill-Equipped: U.S. Prisons and Offenders with Mental Illness, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (2003), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3fe482a57.html; see also Jean 
Casella & James Ridgeway, “Epidemic” of Suicides in Massachusetts Prisons, SOLITARY 
WATCH: NEWS FROM A NATION IN LOCKDOWN (2010), http://solitarywatch.com/2010/
08/06/masschusetts-prisons-see-epidemic-of-suicides/ (describing how suicide in prison 
has become an epidemic). 
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the anguish associated with a life behind bars may exacerbate the health 
conditions he faces, lead him to act out and prompt serious 
contemplation of suicide.50  Instead of providing appropriate medical 
treatment, many prisons treat the mentally ill like healthy inmates and 
move them into solitary confinement, removed from the general prison 
population.51  Here, the inmate loses “good-time,”52 programming and 
other privileges and often waits naked in his cell until his return to 
general population comes due.53 
After completing nation-wide studies of inmate deaths from 2000–
2009, the Bureau of Justice Statistics published a report stating that 
correctional facilities have a variety of tactics at their disposal to respond 
to the mentally ill beyond the use of solitary confinement; yet, in the case 
of state facilities, approximately two-thirds of all prisoners with mental 
health problems did not receive mental health care services after entering 
prison.54  In addition, the Bureau’s report stated that the number of 
inmates committing suicide while in custody is on the rise.55  Moving 
correctional facilities to provide mentally ill prisoners with adequate 
protection and treatment has been difficult56 and courts have not helped 
the situation.  Historically, courts have been reluctant to get involved in 
regulating the management of prisons57 and they have not adopted clear, 
uniformed standards and procedures for dealing with mentally ill 
prisoners themselves.58 
                                                                                                             
 50 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS: PRISON SUICIDE: AN 
OVERVIEW AND GUIDE TO PREVENTION 37–38 (1995), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/012
475.pdf. 
 51 Id. at 7. 
 52 “Good-time” is defined as time that will reduce the duration of the prisoner’s 
sentence.  A prisoner may earn “good-time” for showing positive behavior in prison.  
Good Time Credit Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM (2013), http://definitions.
uslegal.com/g/good-time-credit/. 
 53 Reassessing Solitary Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety 
Consequences Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5 (2012). 
 54 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., DATA COLLECTION: DEATHS 
IN CUSTODY REPORTING PROGRAM (2009), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail
&iid=243. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See Mental Illness, Human Rights, and U.S. Prisons, supra note 4. 
 57 Prisoner’s Rights, CORNELL U. L. SCHOOL (2012), http://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/prisoners_rights. 
 58 See infra Part III and accompanying no/tes; see also William Babcock, Courts 
Return to Hands-off Policy in Prison Rights, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Jul. 31,1989), 
http://articles.philly.com/1989-07-31/news/26134493_1_legitimate-penological-prison-
administrators-institutional-security. 
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Today, laws meant to protect mentally ill prisoners are vague and 
often inconsistently applied.59  For example, the United States Code 
permits one person to bring suit against another who has subjected a 
citizen of the United States to the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”60  When a prisoner 
has been deprived of mental health care or has committed suicide, a 
petitioner may, in what is commonly referred to as a § 1983 claim, rely 
on this provision in order to obtain a remedy against the jail.61  This is 
the case even though the Supreme Court has yet to hear a § 1983 suit 
resulting from a jail-suicide62 and has only generally acknowledged an 
inmate’s right to medical care.63 
In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court held that in order to state a 
cognizable § 1983 claim for depriving an inmate of his Eighth 
Amendment rights, the petitioner must prove that the prison acted with 
deliberate indifference towards the inmate.64  The Court acknowledged 
                                                                                                             
 59 See infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
 60 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). The statute provides, in relevant part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act 
or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall 
not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief 
was unavailable. 
Id. 
 61 See infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
 62 Daniel Goldman & Ryan Brimmer, U.S. Supreme Court Cases, SOLITARY WATCH: 
NEWS FROM A NATION IN LOCKDOWN (2012), http://solitarywatch.com/resources/u-s-
supreme-court-cases/; see Ogloff, Roesch & Hart, supra note 48, at 119 (“Unfortunately, 
the Court has yet to decide a case that directly addresses the extent to which prison and 
jail inmates have the right to psychological or psychiatric assessment and treatment.”). 
 63 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–5 (1976). The Supreme Court held that the 
Eighth Amendment provides the right to medical care because failure to provide adequate 
care constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.  Id. 
 64 See generally Estelle, 429 U.S. 97.  In Estelle, the defendant-inmate who suffered 
intense back pain sought medical attention from several prison-doctors.  Id. at 99.  A 
physician prescribed defendant-inmate pain medication, advised him to refrain from 
heavy work, suggested that he remain in his cell, and ordered him to sleep on a lower 
bunk bed.  Id.  Prison officials refused to comply with the doctor’s orders.  Id.  In 
December, before defendant’s pain had subsided he was ordered to perform light work.  
Id. at 100.  Defendant answered that he was in too much pain to work and prison officials 
subsequently placed him in administrative segregation for non-compliance.  Id.  In mid-
December, defendant saw another doctor who prescribed him medication for intense pain.  
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that a prison’s obligation to provide adequate medical care is rooted in 
“broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity 
and decency”65 and that consideration of “the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”66 is paramount.  
When an inmate is incarcerated, the Court reasoned, he is in the hands of 
the prison system and therefore, a standard must be established to 
determine whether a deprivation of the inmate’s rights occurred.67  The 
Court articulated a two-part test (the “Estelle test”) to determine whether 
a prison deprived an inmate of proper medical care: a showing must be 
made to determine whether (1) the inmate had some serious medical 
need and (2) the prison showed any sign of “deliberate indifference.”68 
While the Supreme Court held that prisons are constitutionally 
required to provide medical care to inmates so they do not suffer 
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,”69 it left the issue of proper 
health care wide open, never clarifying what constitutes a “serious 
medical need” worthy of care nor addressing an inmate’s right to mental 
health care.70  While the need for medical care might be obvious if an 
inmate is suffering from some type of physical ailment,71 the need for 
mental health care is far less clear.72  An inmate’s mental health may not 
                                                                                                             
Id.  But the defendant did not receive his medication on time because the prison staff lost 
his prescription.  Id.  The defendant was moved in and out of segregation through 
December and January and ultimately into solitary confinement.  Id. at 100–01.  Days 
later, the defendant was hospitalized for an irregular heart-rhythm and placed on heart 
medication.  Id.  Shortly thereafter, the defendant asked to see another doctor, but the 
prison officials refused.  Id.  In all, the defendant made seventeen attempts to receive 
appropriate medical care for his injuries.  Id. at 97. 
 65 Id. at 102 (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (1968)). 
 66 Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
 67 Id. at 102–03. 
 68 Id. at 104.  For a more thorough discussion of both parts of the Estelle test, see 
infra (explaining the serious medical need requirement and the deliberate indifference 
requirement). 
 69 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. 
 70 Fred Cohen & Joel Dvoskin, Inmates with Mental Disorders: A Guide to Law and 
Practice, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 339, 341 (1992); see also Ogloff, 
Roesch & Hart, supra note 48, at 119. 
 71 Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990) 
(holding that a serious medical need is one “so obvious that even a lay person would 
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention”). 
 72 Fred Cohen, Captives Right to Mental Health Care, 17 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 
21–22 (1993).  Cohen points out the highly subjective nature of deliberate indifference, 
describing that “it is actually the clinicians’ choice of the diagnostic terminology which 
will move these cases from no care to discretionary care or to mandated care.” Id.; see 
also Johnathan Fish, Overcrowding on the Ship of Fools: Health Care Reform, Psychiatry 
and the Uncertain Future of Normality , 11 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 181 (2012).  Fish 
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be readily apparent and, if it is, it might not be exhibited regularly and 
consistently.73  Notwithstanding these differences, many circuit courts 
have held that mental illness and physical illness are one and the same 
and have applied the Estelle test to examine whether an inmate received 
proper mental health care.74 
With respect to the first prong of the Estelle test, circuit courts have 
interpreted what constitutes a “serious medical need” differently.75  For 
example, in Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, the First Circuit 
defined serious medical need as a need that “has been diagnosed by a 
physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a 
lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s 
attention . . . the ‘seriousness’ of an inmate’s needs may also be 
determined by reference to the effect of the delay of treatment.”76  Thus, 
a petitioner may claim a “serious medical need” exists by showing the 
existence of (1) a prior diagnosis and treatment or (2) an obvious need 
for treatment.77  The Ninth Circuit, however, has defined “serious 
medical need” differently, as the “failure to treat a prisoner’s condition 
[that] could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain.”78 
                                                                                                             
affirms the highly subjective nature of mental illness in general, describing that the 
physician is the “arbiter of what is normal and what is not” and therefore, “mental illness 
is a “paradoxical reality of . . . fundamental skepticism coexisting with . . . triumphalist 
reductionism.”  Id. at 220. 
 73 Dean Keith Simonton, Are Genius and Madness Related? Contemporary Answers 
to an Ancient Question, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (2005), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/
display/article/10168/52456. 
 74 See Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir.1977); Greason v. Kemp, 891 
F.2d 829, 834 (11th Cir.1990); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(holding that the same general “requirements apply to physical, dental and mental 
health”). 
 75 See, e.g., Gaudreault, 923 F.2d at 208.  See generally McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 
1050 (9th Cir. 1992).  In McGuckin, the plaintiff-inmate brought a § 1983 action against 
the Arizona Department of Corrections alleging that the prison officials were deliberately 
indifferent to his serious medical needs.  Id. at 1052. 
 76 See Gaudreault, 923 F.2d at 208 (citing Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional 
Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346–47 (3d Cir. 1987)). 
 77 Id. 
 78 See generally McGuckin, 974 F.2d 1050.  John McGuckin, an inmate in an Arizona 
state correctional facility brought a § 1983 action against prison medical staff arguing that 
they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.  Id. at 1052.  McGuckin 
did not receive surgery to repair a physical injury he had suffered until after he filed his 
§ 1983 claim against the prison.  Id. at 1061–62. 
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Once a petitioner is able to prove that an inmate had a “serious 
medical need,”79 he must then prove the second part of the Estelle test: 
that jailers were deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s needs.80  While 
the first prong of the Estelle test might seem difficult to prove, the 
second prong is substantially more vague and unpredictable.81  In Estelle, 
the Supreme Court held that “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s 
serious illness or injury states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983”82 and can manifest in two ways: the correctional facility might 
take some inappropriate affirmative action in response to the prisoner’s 
needs or it might not act on the prisoner’s needs.83  The court stated that 
deliberate indifference is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind” but 
failed to elaborate further.84 
In 1994, the Supreme Court tried to clarify the deliberate 
indifference standard.85  In Farmer v. Brennan, a transsexual who 
underwent an unsuccessful gender-reassignment surgery sued federal 
prison officials claiming that they had violated his Eighth Amendment 
rights.86  Farmer was assigned a cell amongst the general prison 
population and was raped and beaten by another inmate.87   The Court in 
Farmer spelled out what a prisoner must prove in order to bring suit 
against a correctional facility.88  The Court ruled that a successful 
deliberate indifference claim requires a finding that the prison was 
subjectively aware of the inmate’s condition.89  In other words, in order 
to prove deliberate indifference, the petitioner must show that that the 
jailer knew of the prisoner’s serious medical need and effectively did 
nothing about it.90   It also limited the scope of deliberate indifference by 
defining what constitutes a serious medical need.91   Yet, the Supreme 
                                                                                                             
 79 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
 80 Id. 
 81 See infra Part III and accompanying discussion. 
 82 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 
 83 Id. at 106. 
 84 Id. (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 471 (1947)). 
 85 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
 86 Id. at 831. 
 87 Id. at 830. 
 88 Id. at 841–46 (“Whether an official has knowledge of a particular need, however, 
is a question of fact that can be resolved in favor of the inmate if the trier of fact could 
conclude that the official must have known of the need from the very fact that it was so 
obvious.”). 
 89 Id. at 845. 
 90 Id. at 829, 845–46. 
 91 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843.  The Court stated that a serious medical need is a “risk of 
serious damage to his future health.”  Id. 
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Court in Farmer did not clarify how this standard would apply in cases 
where a prisoner is claiming a denial of adequate mental health care or 
where a petitioner is bringing a § 1983 jail-suicide action.92 
Justice Stevens recognized that the deliberate indifference standard 
still lacks clarity.93   He argued that the majority in Estelle gave the 
prison system too much authority to determine whether the inmate had a 
serious medical need and made it too easy for the prison to refute a claim 
of deliberate indifference.94  While a petitioner might be able to prove the 
existence of a serious medical need, especially if an inmate’s mental 
illness predated his incarceration, proving that a jail acted with deliberate 
indifference is complicated, if not nearly impossible.95 
III. APPLICATION OF THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD IN 
§ 1983 JAIL-SUICIDE CLAIMS 
Without any guidance from the Supreme Court, the circuit courts 
have interpreted and applied the deliberate indifference standard in a 
variety of ways in adjudicating § 1983 claims related to mental health 
care in prisons.96  A look at the plain meaning of the words “deliberate” 
and “indifference” allows for various and conflicting interpretations of 
the standard.97  Circuit courts have inconsistently interpreted deliberate 
indifference to mean either knowledge and a failure to act,98 an 
inexcusable lack of due care,99 criminal recklessness,100 tortuous 
                                                                                                             
 92 Id. at 829, 845. 
 93 Holly Boyer, Home Sweet Hell: An Analysis of the Eighth Amendment’s ‘Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment’ Clause as Applied to Supermax Prisons, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 317, 
332–33 (2003) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116 (1976)) (noting that Justice 
Stevens disagreed with the majority’s decision to use the deliberate indifference standard, 
noting its highly subjective nature).  In Estelle, Justice Stevens stated: “it is impossible to 
assess the quality of the medical attention [prisoner] received.”  Estelle, 429 U.S. at 110. 
 94 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Boyer, supra note 93, at 
332–33. 
 95 BOYER, supra note 93, at 332–33. 
 96 See discussion infra. 
 97 See generally Russel W. Gray, Comment, Wilson v. Seiter; Defining the 
Components of and Proposing a Direction for Eighth Amendment Prison Condition Law, 
41 AM. U. L. REV. 1339 (1992). 
 98 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (establishing that prisons have 
a duty of care towards inmates).  The Supreme Court ruled that a prison’s failure to 
provide inmate with treatment and take reasonable steps to protect the inmate constituted 
deliberate indifference.  Id. at  311.  The Court found deliberate indifference despite there 
being no clear Constitutional authority on point.  Id. at 330. 
 99 Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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recklessness,101 callousness102 or allowing systemic gross deficiencies.103  
In Billman v. Indiana Dep’t of Corrections,104 the Seventh Circuit 
articulated its own interpretation of “deliberate indifference” by stating: 
If [the prison] place[s] a prisoner in a cell that has a cobra, but 
they do not know that there is a cobra there (or even that there is 
a high probability that there is a cobra there), they are not guilty 
of deliberate indifference even if they should have known about 
the risk, that is, even if they were negligent—even grossly 
negligent or even reckless in the tort sense—in failing to know. 
But if they know that there is a cobra there or at least that there is 
a high probability of a cobra there, and do nothing, that is 
deliberate indifference.105 
The circuit courts are extremely divided in their interpretation and 
application of the deliberate indifference standard when adjudicating 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 jail-suicide actions.106  This fissure is readily apparent 
when examining two cases, one from the Eleventh Circuit and the other 
from the Third Circuit.107 
A. Hazleton v. DeKalb County – Eleventh Circuit 
In Hazleton v. DeKalb County, Joshua Hazleton, a 19-year-old 
pretrial detainee, committed suicide in a Georgia jail.108  Hazleton first 
arrived at the DeKalb County jail on January 24, 2006 to await his trial 
after being charged with murder.109  The inmate went through an initial 
                                                                                                             
 100 Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that “gross 
negligence” is not enough to find deliberate indifference; rather, criminal negligence is 
the correct standard). 
 101 See Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a prison acts 
with deliberate indifference if it recklessly disregarded an inmate’s right to be free from 
risk of harm); Wright v. Jones, 907 F.2d 848, 851 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that reckless 
disregard is the measurable standard constituting deliberate indifference); Berry v. City of 
Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1495–96 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that deliberate indifference 
occurs when a prison’s policy “disregards a known or obvious risk”). 
 102 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (holding that deliberate indifference is akin 
to “callous indifference to federally-protected rights”). 
 103 See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505–06 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a 
prison may act with deliberate indifference towards the inmate if shows systemic and 
gross deficiencies or a pattern of negligence). 
 104 Billman v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 105 Id. at 788 (citations omitted). 
 106 See infra discussion accompanying footnotes 108-55. 
 107 See infra discussion accompanying footnotes 108-55. 
 108 Hazelton v. DeKalb Cnty., 496 F. App’x 931 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 109 Id. at 932. 
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medical screening and was assigned to the general population.110   One 
month later, in February 2006, the jail’s mental health staff evaluated 
Hazelton for the first time; he went through ten subsequent, independent 
evaluations until his death in January 2007.111  In June 2006, Hazleton 
was diagnosed with “psychiatric disorder” by a jail psychiatrist and was 
prescribed anti-psychotic medication.112  In October, jail officials placed 
Hazleton on suicide watch after he stated that he wanted to hurt 
himself.113  That same month, a DeKalb County Superior Court judge 
declared Hazleton incompetent to stand trial and ordered that he be 
transferred to a hospital facility.114  Hazleton never made it to that 
hospital.  On January 9, 2007, he committed suicide.115  None of the 
officers on watch that night had any information regarding Hazleton’s 
mental state or previous medical history.116  Shortly after his death, 
Hazleton’s mother filed a § 1983 action against the officers, the county 
and other individuals, alleging that all defendants were deliberately 
indifferent to her son’s mental health care needs.117 
In Hazleton, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that to prevail on a § 1983 
jail-suicide action, the plaintiff must show that defendants “displayed 
deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s taking of his own life.”118  The 
court stated that a showing of “deliberate indifference requires that the 
defendant deliberately disregard[ed] a strong likelihood rather than a 
mere possibility that the self-infliction of harm will occur.”119   In this 
case, Hazleton was placed in general population, despite stating his 
intention to commit suicide.120  On the night that Hazleton committed 
suicide, he sounded an emergency button several times, according to 
written statements by other inmates on the cell block, and no one 
responded to his call.121 Notwithstanding these facts, the court ruled that 
the plaintiffs did not meet their evidentiary burden and affirmed the 
district court’s ruling in favor of the prison officials.122  According to the 
                                                                                                             
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Hazleton, 496 F. App’x at 932. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 933. 
 117 Id. at 932. 
 118 Id. at 933. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Hazleton, 496 F. App’x at 932. 
 121 Id. at 933. 
 122 Id. at 934. 
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Eleventh Circuit, stating an intention to commit suicide and sounding the 
alarm button several times did not constitute a strong likelihood that the 
self-infliction of harm would occur.123 
The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling was significant in that it shaped the 
deliberate indifference standard based on probability and not on any rigid 
framework.124  The court did not elaborate on what a “strong likelihood” 
means; it did not provide any metric system to quantify a “strong 
likelihood” and it did not explain how to distinguish between a “strong 
likelihood” versus a “mere possibility.”125  In addition, the court 
articulated a definition of deliberate indifference that only considered 
bodily harm, not mental illness.126  A petitioner must prove that jail 
officials disregarded a strong likelihood that a prisoner would self-inflict 
physical harm as opposed to suffer some psychiatric consequence.127  
The court’s definition did not create a rigid link between the jail’s actions 
and the inmate’s actions.128  It only contemplated whether a strong 
chance existed that the prisoner would hurt himself.129 
Curiously, the court held that a “strong likelihood” of harm did not 
exist in the Hazleton case despite facts in the record that might suggest 
otherwise.130  This begs the question: who should be the judge of whether 
“strong likelihood” of harm exists in such matters and based on what 
evidence should such a determination be made?131  Should a medical 
professional have to declare whether a strong likelihood exists that a 
prisoner will commit harm to himself?  Should the prison facility make 
the determination itself?  The Eleventh Circuit has equivocated on this 
issue132 and, in doing so, has interpreted “deliberate indifference” in a 
                                                                                                             
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 933. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Hazleton, 496 F. App’x at 933. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Note, for instance, that the court did not say, “If jailer acted in X way and prisoner 
reacted in Y way, then deliberate indifference shall be found to have existed.”  Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 See, e.g., Harris v. Coweta Cnty., 21 F.3d 388, 393–94 (1994) (“[D]eliberate 
indifference could be inferred from an unexplained delay in treating a known or obvious 
serious medical condition” and “the contours of the legal norms on deliberate 
indifference to medical needs have been subsequently evolving.”); see also City of 
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (holding that deliberate indifference stems 
from a showing of whether or not prison officials were adequately trained). 
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manner inconsistent with its own precedent and with other 
jurisdictions.133 
B.  Baez v. Lancaster County – Third Circuit 
In Baez v. Lancaster County, Marva Baez brought a § 1983 action 
against the Lancaster County Prison, alleging that the jailer acted with 
deliberate indifference towards her brother, Luis Villafane, an inmate 
who committed suicide.134  Mr. Villafane was in the Lancaster County 
Prison after being arrested for rape, aggravated assault and other serious 
crimes.135   After being committed to the Lancaster County Prison, Mr. 
Villafane met with a nurse who asked him a series of questions about his 
medical and mental history.136  Mr. Villafane told the nurse that he had 
recently lost his mother and that he had nothing to look forward to and, 
as a result, he was placed on a suicide watch.137  Mr. Villafane also met 
with a psychologist who provided medical services for the Lancaster 
County Prison.138  The doctor spoke to Mr. Villafane and took him off of 
suicide-watch, but noted, “inmates who are taken off suicide status might 
still be suicidal.”139  After a confrontation with prison guards, Mr. 
Villafane asked to be placed in a suicide-prevention cell because he was 
“stressing.”140  Prison officials honored his request and gave him a smock 
to wear.141  Three days later, prison officials downgraded Mr. Villafane’s 
suicide status and four days after that, they downgraded him even further 
to general observation.142  Approximately ten days later, Mr. Villafane 
was transferred to a regular cell.143  During the transfer, a fellow inmate 
testified that he heard Mr. Villafane say he was going to kill himself.144  
On November 18, 2008, Mr. Villafane ripped his bed sheets and hung 
himself inside his prison cell.145 
                                                                                                             
 133 See, e.g., infra discussion accompanying notes 137–58. 
 134 Baez v. Lancaster Cnty., 487 F. App’x 30 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 135 Baez v. Lancaster Cnty., CIV.A. 09-2745, 2011 WL 4948891, at *1(E.D. Pa. Oct. 
18, 2011), aff’d, 487 F. App’x 30 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 See Baez, 2011 WL 4948891, at *3. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at *4. 
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On appeal, the Third Circuit examined how jailers treated Mr. 
Villafane and applied its own unique formulation of the deliberate 
indifference standard.146  Specifically, the court examined whether “(1) 
the detainee had a ‘particular vulnerability to suicide,’ (2) the custodial 
officer or officers knew or should have known of that vulnerability, and 
(3) those officers ‘acted with reckless indifference’ to the detainee’s 
particular vulnerability.”147  The court found that deliberate indifference 
calls for both objective and subjective scrutiny, and found that the 
officers did not know and should not have known, based on the evidence, 
of the inmate’s particular vulnerability to suicide.148  Specifically, the 
court relied heavily on the third prong of the test and found that the 
jailers did not act recklessly when dealing with Mr. Villafane.149  In using 
the term “reckless indifference,” the court created a high threshold to 
prove deliberate indifference, one akin to criminal liability.150  In fact, the 
court stated that proving deliberate indifference requires “a level of 
culpability higher than a negligent failure to protect from self-inflicted 
harm.”151 
Since the Supreme Court has yet to provide any guidance on how 
the deliberate indifference standard should apply to cases dealing with 
mental health care in prisons, circuit courts have inconsistently applied 
the standard in such disputes.152  Within only a few weeks of each other, 
two circuit courts split on what the deliberate indifference standard 
means in the context of § 1983 jail-suicide claims.153  Whereas in the 
Eleventh Circuit, a petitioner must rely heavily on speculation that a 
“strong likelihood” of self-harm will occur in order to prevail in his 
                                                                                                             
 146 See generally Baez v. Lancaster Cnty., 487 F. App’x 30 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 147 Id. at 31. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 32. 
 150 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2012).  The Model Penal Code adopts recklessly as 
standard of criminal culpability, described as: 
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense 
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the 
actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves 
a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person 
would observe in the actor’s situation. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 151 Baez, 487 F. App’x at 31. 
 152 See supra discussion accompanying notes 96–107. 
 153 See supra discussion accompanying notes 108–51. 
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claim, in the Third Circuit, a petitioner must rely on reckless 
indifference, a well-developed tort and criminal-based standard.154 
This is problematic because if an inmate commits suicide while in 
custody, a petitioner’s ability to prevail against a jail will vary 
significantly depending on where the suit is brought.  For example, in the 
Third Circuit, it seems unlikely that a petitioner could prove that the 
jailer acted with reckless indifference or that the jailer grossly deviated 
from a more typical standard of care in the moments leading up to the 
prisoner’s death.  This has created a multitude of outcomes—a variation 
in the type of mental health care provided by prisons—among cases that 
are factually quite similar.155   This split allows prisons across the 
country to offer different degrees of mental health care to inmates 
depending on which circuit the prison is located within. 
IV. USING INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A GUIDE TO REFORM MENTAL 
HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS AND RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
As scientific advances and public interest in mental health issues 
grow, international law dealing with mental health issues has developed.  
Looking to international law may provide important guidance in creating 
legal clarity amongst the circuit courts and may help to create a 
uniformed standard of mental health care in prisons across the country.156  
According to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”), “all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with 
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human 
person.”157  The United States should look to the ICCPR, as well as other 
international legal mechanisms, for guidance as they provide an 
alternative to the country’s failed policies and promote the dignity of all 
human beings.158  In fact, applying international human rights laws to 
solve domestic challenges is not a novel idea.159  Various public law 
groups, individual attorneys and even Supreme Court justices have all 
advocated for applying international law to solve national issues.160  
                                                                                                             
 154 See supra discussion accompanying notes 108–51. 
 155 See generally Part III and accompanying notes. 
 156 See discussion infra. 
 157 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 
1966, art. 10(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
 158 Alvin Bronstein & Jenni Gainsborough, Using International Human Rights Laws 
and Standards for U.S. Prison Reform, 24 PACE L. REV. 811, 814 (2004). 
 159 Id. at 815. 
 160 Id.  See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 244 (2003); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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While not self-executing, international law such as treaties can trump 
state law and provide solid guidance on how to deal with prison 
conditions.161  Domestic courts have cited the United Nations Standard 
for the Minimum Treatment of Prisoners,162 for example, even though it 
is not binding.163 
In addition, international human rights mechanisms like the 
American Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (“IACPPT”) lay out clear 
prohibitions against inhumane treatment towards prisoners.164  For 
example, Article Six of the IACPPT states that governments shall “take 
effective measures to prevent and punish other cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment within their jurisdiction.”165  In other 
words, the United States should not just take any measure to prevent 
inhuman treatment towards prisoners.  Rather, the government should 
take effective measures to ensure that prisoners are being treated with 
dignity and receiving an appropriate standard of care.166 
Taking the IACPPT and other international mechanisms into 
consideration, the United States should first create some new protocol for 
prisons to meet basic human rights obligations towards the mentally ill 
and reduce the number of jail-suicides amongst inmates.  The MI 
principles, promulgated in 1991 by the United Nations General 
Assembly, also provide an important framework for reform, outlining 
                                                                                                             
 161 See Bronstein & Gainsborough, supra note 158 at 817. 
 162 Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,, E.S.C. Res. 633C 
(XXJV) U.N. ESCOR, Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/611 (1950), U.N. ESCOR, Supp. 
No. 1, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended by E.S.C. Res. 2076, (LXII), U.N. 
ESCOR, Supp. No. 1, at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977). 
 163 See, e.g., Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 622 (1981); Jordan v. Arnold, 408 F. 
Supp. 869, 874 (M.D. Pa. 1976); 
Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 740 (Utah 1996). 
 164 The American Convention on Human Rights is available at http:// www.oas.org/
juridico/English/treaties/b-32.html. The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and 
Punish Torture is available at http://www.oas.org/JURIDICO/ENGLISH/Treaties/a-
51.html. 
 165 See Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, supra note 164.  
Article 7 states: 
The States Parties shall take measures so that, in the training of police 
officers and other public officials responsible for the custody of persons 
temporarily or definitively deprived of their freedom, special emphasis shall 
be put on the prohibition of the use of torture in interrogation, detention, or 
arrest. 
Id. 
 166 Id.  The convention incorporates four primary goals; the prevention, investigation, 
sanction and reparation of human rights violations. 
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that the mentally ill have: (1) a right to individualized treatment; (2) a 
right to rehabilitation and treatment that enhances autonomy; (3) a right 
to independence and social integration; (4) a right to least restrictive 
services and (5) a right to community-based services, amongst others.167   
This framework is clear and, were the United States to apply it, those 
with mental illness in custody would likely receive greater protection 
than they do now. 
In addition to reforming the current prison system through on-the-
ground measures, the United States should revise its current legal 
framework with respect to adjudicating jail-suicide claims, as it has 
negatively impacted mental health care in prisons.  The deliberate 
indifference standard, currently used by courts, is confusing and has 
caused a split amongst the circuit courts.168  It has created a system where 
prisons across the country are held to different variations of the legal 
standard and those challenging the prison have an unclear, inconsistent 
chance at obtaining a remedy.169  In order to create predictability 
amongst the circuits and uniformly and positively impact mental health 
care in prisons, the judiciary should adopt a clearer standard to adjudicate 
§ 1983 jail-suicide claims: one of due diligence. 
The due diligence standard has long been a part of international 
jurisprudence and references to the standard can be found in declarations 
from the ancient Roman Empire.170  Under this standard, a state is 
required to prevent, investigate, punish and provide remedies for human 
rights violations.171  In 1988, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
revisited the due diligence standard in the landmark case Velásquez 
Rodríguez v. Honduras, which concerned the disappearance of Manfredo 
Velásquez.172  The court held that “[a]n illegal act which violates human 
rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State (for 
example, because it is the act of a private person or because the person 
responsible has not been identified) can lead to international 
responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the 
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 168 See supra discussion Part III. 
 169 See supra discussion Part III. 
 170 See Jan Arno Hessbruegge, The Historical Development of the Doctrines of 
Attribution and Due Diligence in International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 265, 
278 (2004). 
 171 Yakin Ertürk, The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of 
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lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as 
required by the Convention.”173  The Velásquez case defined the due 
diligence standard as a mechanism to prevent attacks on a person’s life, 
physical integrity or liberty from degrading and negligible practices.174  
In recent years, due diligence has been invoked, though sparingly, to help 
drive prison reform and prevent these sort of attacks on inmates.175 
Whereas under the deliberate indifference standard, a prison may 
easily be able to escape liability, a standard of due diligence is more 
difficult to overcome, requiring something extra and more specific on the 
part of the prison.176  This is an affirmative defense: the jail can escape 
liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a high 
managerial agent—a prison official—acted with “due diligence” to 
prevent an offense from occurring.177  In the context of § 1983 jail-
suicide claims, a due diligence standard would require a prison to show 
all of the affirmative steps it took to prevent an inmate from committing 
suicide, which would likely entail some measure of mental health care. 
V. COUNTERVAILING CONSIDERATIONS 
Several obstacles exist in adopting and applying international legal 
and human rights standards to reform domestic laws and practices.  For 
centuries, the United States has generally viewed international human 
rights laws, standards and norms as a tool to put other less 
compassionate, less welcoming nations on notice of democratic values.178  
This nation has believed that its own Constitution, supplemented by 
strong laws, guarantees far more rights than those conferred by 
international human rights laws.179 
In addition, the United States justice system has generally 
considered the prison system to be a “dark world” and as such, courts are 
apt to take a “hands off approach” to prison reform.180  In fact, this 
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country’s bout with frivolous lawsuits served to undermine prison 
litigation, often allowing harsh prison conditions to go unnoticed and 
even dismissed in the most conservative courts.181  Such a climate 
prompted the passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997(e), for example, which has limited inmates’ access to the courts 
and has restricted the judiciary’s ability to reform harsh prison 
conditions.182  However, one look at the prison system – and over thirty 
years of litigation challenging the system – makes plain that the 
Constitution and domestic practices are simply failing to protect 
prisoners.183 
Furthermore, opponents may raise concerns regarding the 
public/private dichotomy in international human rights law and domestic 
law, both of which were founded upon a minimalist conception of the 
State.184   International law, like domestic law, has often held the 
“private” sphere to be off limits to State intervention.185  Adopting a 
stringent, uniform, due diligence standard to adjudicate § 1983 jail-
suicide claims and enacting necessary reforms might be difficult, 
considering the increasingly vast number of private for-profit prisons in 
this country.186 Private prisons have eroded the government’s federal 
prison policies, wielding extreme influence over legislators and criminal 
justice policies in order to create a market for their products.187  These 
for-profit entities have championed pro-incarceration policies and have 
challenged prison reform through vigorous judicial appeal, lobbying and 
political advocacy.188  Private prisons would likely challenge the 
adoption of any standard that places greater restrictions on the prison 
system as a whole.  However, creating a uniform system of mental health 
care in prisons and adopting a more precise legal definition to adjudicate 
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§ 1983 jail-suicide claims based on international standards would likely 
have a positive effect on these prisons by creating a more rigid 
operational framework and greater predictability in mental health care 
and suicide-related proceedings. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The United States must address mental health care in prisons.  
Today, there is no standard protocol for providing adequate mental 
health care to individuals behind bars and notably, jail-suicides are 
increasing.189  Moreover, the justice system has adopted an imprecise 
standard for adjudicating § 1983 jail-suicide claims, creating a circuit 
split amongst the courts and more uncertainty in jailhouse practices.190  
Adoption of a precise due diligence standard would reform jail practices 
and avert human rights violations by placing greater emphasis on 
affirmative practices, which the current deliberate indifference standard 
fails to achieve.191  This would help ensure that mentally ill prisoners are 
receiving adequate mental health care prior to reentry and enable the 
United States to protect all its citizens, from top to bottom. 
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